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Abstract  
This study examines the informativeness and credibility of the reasons cited by independent 
directors for resignation. Given that directors are privy to private information about the firm, they 
may resign in anticipation of future underperformance in order to limit potential damage to their 
reputation. We posit that directors have an economic incentive not to disclose the true reason for 
their resignation in order to protect their existing equity ownership, business relationships, and 
future directorship opportunities. Consistent with these conjectures, we find that the likelihood of 
resignation increases with reputation and weak future performance. Moreover, cases where 
ambiguous or unverifiable resignation reasons are given, or no reason is provided, are associated 
with poor recent and future financial and operating performance. Investors and analysts appear to 
at least partially understand and respond to such misrepresentations, as evidenced by an 
immediate negative and economically significant market reaction and downward forecast 
revisions. Complementary factors such as positive concurrent operating results and richer 
information environment seem to alleviate investor concerns and mitigate the negative reaction. 
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I. Introduction  
 
This study examines the informativeness and credibility of the reasons cited by 
independent directors for resignation. The importance of independent directors has 
increased in recent years, particularly from the perspective of regulators, as evidenced by 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) requirement that audit committees be composed entirely 
of independent directors, as well as by the listing standards of U.S. exchanges which 
require boards to have a majority of independent directors. These requirements stem from 
the perceived advantages of appointing independent directors as monitors and advisers to 
management in that they are less beholden to the firm and/or the CEO, and add expertise 
and new perspectives to boards which might otherwise lack diversity.
1
 Notwithstanding, 
there is growing evidence that independent directors—who are supposed to represent the 
interests of shareholders and maximize shareholder value—often act in ways that 
maximize their own utility at the expense of shareholders. For example, independent 
directors may support generous compensation packages to managers for personal reasons 
such as a desire to be reelected to the board or to enhance their business relationship with 
the firm (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006). In addition, independent directors are likely to resign 
following poor firm performance, possibly to avoid the workload associated with 
restructuring the firm’s operations (Yermack, 2004), or in anticipation of poor 
forthcoming performance, at a critical time when advisers are most needed (Gupta and 
Fields, 2009; Asthana and Balsam, 2009; Fahlenbrach et al., 2010).  
We extend this line of research by examining the circumstances surrounding 
independent directors’ departures and the informativeness and credibility of the reasons 
cited for resignation, particularly where it may be related to concerns about the future 
performance of the firm. Aside from the legal responsibility to disclose fully and fairly all 
material information, the motive for departure is important information for investors, and 
                                                 
1
 The empirical evidence on the impact of independent directors on firm performance is mixed. Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1990) find a positive market reaction to the nomination of independent directors to the board. 
Core et al. (1999) document a positive association between the fraction of independent directors and the 
market-to-book-ratio. Nguyen and Nielsen (2009) find a negative market reaction to the sudden death of an 
independent director. In contrast, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Klein 
(1998), and Bhagat and Black (1997, 2002) provide evidence that there is no positive association between 
firm value and independent directors. 
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allows shareholders to react in a timely manner. We use the terms ‘resignation’ and 
‘departure’ interchangeably to cover both resignation and refusal to stand for reelection, 
consistent with SEC filing guidelines.
2
   
Directorships bring many benefits to the individual in terms of business 
connections, reputation and compensation (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Yermack, 2004; Perry 2000; Linn and Park, 2003). A resignation signals that the 
‘cost’ of serving on a board exceeds the benefits. The cost includes primarily the time 
commitment and the risk to the director’s reputation, the latter being the most significant 
(Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Directors who are privy to inside information 
about the firm may resign when they anticipate future underperformance in order to limit 
potential damage to their reputation (Gupta and Fields, 2009; Asthana and Balsam, 2009; 
Fahlenbrach et al., 2010). While the evidence in the literature is consistent with greater 
likelihood of director resignation both following and in anticipation of weak operating 
and financial performance, it does not allow us to determine whether reputation concerns 
actually lead to the decision to resign when directors anticipate poor future performance.  
Our first set of analyses show that the likelihood of departures increases 
unconditionally with reputation concerns and past negative profitability. In addition, our 
results indicate that director departures are motivated by the preservation of reputational 
capital in anticipation of poor firm performance. Moreover, those with a high reputation 
are more likely to resign in anticipation of weak future performance. 
Regardless of reputation, departing directors have an incentive to disguise the true 
reason for their departure when this is due to concerns about future performance. 
Attributing the departure to concerns about future performance (for example, by citing 
“disagreement”) would have no apparent benefit for the departing director. First, 
conveying the true reason for the departure would likely trigger an immediate negative 
market reaction (Agrawal and Chen, 2009; Dewally and Peck, 2009), which would 
adversely affect the financial position of the departing director, as well as that of 
management and the remaining directors. Second, it would likely increase public scrutiny 
of both the board and management, and may open the door to shareholder intervention 
                                                 
2
 SEC Form 8-K, Item 5.02 (a)(1): “If a director has resigned or refuses to stand for re-election to the board 
of directors” 
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and even litigation – consequences which could undermine the departing director’s 
relationship with management and the remaining directors. Indeed dissenting directors 
experience a decline in the number of board appointments they are offered in the future 
(Marshall, 2010). Hence, they may disguise the true motive for resignation by citing 
benign or ambiguous motives such as ‘time constraints’ and ‘personal reasons’, or by not 
providing an explanation.  
To facilitate a comprehensive analysis of the resignation announcements and their 
informativeness, we use data from Audit Analytics to identify all resignation cases from 
2004 through 2012. We group the reasons for departure into four mutually exclusive 
categories. The first category, henceforth referred to as ‘Disagreement’, includes all 
resignations where the outside director or the company specifically cites a disagreement 
with management on a matter relating to the company’s operations, policies or practices. 
It thus includes cases where the resignation provides a strong signal that the director has 
concerns about the future performance of the firm.
3
 It also covers a handful of cases (five 
in our sample period) of ‘Investigations’, where the reason cited for departure is the 
launch or existence of a formal investigation of the director (for example by the SEC, and 
normally unrelated to the directorship).
4
 The second category, accounting for over 60% 
of the sample, is ‘No Reason’. The third category is ‘Outside Commitments’. The fourth 
is ‘Personal’, where the stated reason for departure is related to family, health, retirement 
or other personal concerns. (Appendix A shows typical 8-K reports with different 
categories of resignation).
5
 
Our examination of resignation announcement returns reveals a negative and 
economically significant reaction not only to the Disagreement and Investigation 
categories but also to the more ambiguous and unverifiable categories of No Reason and 
                                                 
3
 It is conceivable that some resignations with disagreement cannot be entirely attributed to concerns about 
future performance, but may be rather related to personal differences with the CEO or to past and present 
events. Nevertheless, this category is the most likely to explicitly include resignation cases due to such 
concerns.   
4
 We combine these five cases into one category with disagreements for ease of presentation, due to their 
small number and because they are similarly verifiable and likely negative reasons. However, 
investigations are first and foremost indicative of potential wrongdoing by the director, not the firm, and 
thus we also conduct the analysis excluding these five cases (untabulated). Results remain the same. 
5
 Arguably there is not much difference between Outside Commitments and Personal. We opt to treat them 
separately because of the large portion of cases where the director specifically indicates 'outside 
commitment' as the reason for the departure. 
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Outside Commitments. Furthermore, returns in the year prior to as well as following the 
latter departure categories are negative and economically significant as well. A similar 
picture emerges when we examine past and future operating performance surrounding 
these ambiguous departures, indicating weak operating performance preceding as well as 
following these seemingly benign departure categories.  
 We further investigate the issue of seemingly benign motives by partitioning the 
reasons cited for departures into two groups based on the perceived reliability and 
verifiability of the reason cited (Mercer, 2004; Hutton, Miller and Skinner, 2003). We 
read through all relevant 8-K filings to determine the credibility of the stated motive. The 
‘verifiable’ group includes ‘Health’ – an unlikely excuse to be used opportunistically 
since it is verifiable and likely to hinder existing and additional employment options; 
‘Retirement’ (at the age of 69 or older, or due to firm’s mandatory retirement policy) – a 
verifiable and transparent reason; ‘Disagreement’ and ‘Investigation’ which are 
accompanied by company disclosures detailing the reasons; and ‘Outside Commitments’ 
and ‘Personal Reasons’ where details about commitments and personal circumstances are 
explicitly revealed. In contrast, the ‘non-verifiable’ group includes ‘No Reason’, 
voluntary ‘Retirement’, ‘Outside Commitments’ and ‘Personal Reasons’ where no 
additional information about outside activities and personal circumstances is disclosed, 
and hence the motive is undefined and less credible. 
We find that resignations where ambiguous or unverifiable reasons are cited, or 
no reason is provided, are preceded as well as followed by poor financial and operating 
performance (equity returns, profitability and cash flows in the year preceding and 
following the resignation date), casting serious doubt on the true motivation for departure 
and the reliability of the explanation given. Furthermore, investors do not appear to be 
convinced by such seemingly benign explanations. We document negative abnormal 
returns around these resignation announcements that are both statistically and 
economically significant, suggesting that resignations by independent directors send a 
negative signal to capital markets about future firm performance. In contrast, past and 
future financial and operating performance are not different from zero when the director 
provides a verifiable and neutral reason for departure.  
 5 
 
As an added measure, we investigate whether and to what extent financial 
analysts – presumably adept at information gathering and interpretation – are better able 
to see through the justification provided and translate the implications of the departure 
into tangible forecasts. We find negative analyst forecast revisions following ambiguous 
and unverifiable director departures. These findings provide additional support for our 
conjecture that some directors who resign voluntarily do not cite the true reason for their 
departure when it is related to concerns about future performance.
6
 
The picture that emerges from our analyses implies a potential breach of fiduciary 
duty by some independent directors, with possible collusion or tacit agreement on the part 
of firms. Indeed, the perceived advantages of appointing outside “independent” directors 
as monitors and advisers to management seem to take a back seat to personal incentives, 
reputational capital and self-preservation on the part of some independent directors. This 
extends beyond the mere omission or concealment of a director’s concerns about the 
business; at best their governance role in monitoring and advising management will be 
feeble and ‘off the record’. These findings help to explain the conflicting evidence in 
prior research regarding the benefits of director independence.  
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, to our knowledge it 
is the first to examine the reasons cited for resignations by independent directors. Second, 
we present evidence that directors are likely to disguise the true reason for resignation 
whenever it is related to concerns about future performance. This central finding provides 
additional support to our conjecture that independent directors often take actions that 
maximize their own utility at the direct expense of shareholders, especially in the absence 
of other monitoring mechanisms. Third, we show that investors and analysts at least 
partially understand and respond to these potential misrepresentations. 
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant prior 
literature and develops the hypotheses, section 3 describes the data, section 4 presents the 
results, and section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
6
 This is not to imply that all resignations relate to concerns about the future performance of the firm. For 
example, some directors who cite time constraints may provide an honest description of their reason for 
departure. We argue that among those who offer time constraints as a reason for departure, there are cases 
where the departure is actually related to concerns about future performance.  
 6 
 
II. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
 
2.1 Director Resignations, Performance, and Reputation 
When deciding whether to resign, directors trade off the benefits provided by the 
directorship position against the cost of continuing to serve on the board.
7
 Directorships 
provide several important benefits: business relationships, learning business practices 
from high-quality managers, the opportunity to contribute to society (Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989) and acquiring reputation as an expert in decision control and monitoring, 
which in turn may help to secure additional board appointments (Fama and Jensen, 1983) 
and compensation. The importance of compensation has increased in the past decade as a 
growing number of directors are compensated by equity-related instruments such as stock 
options and restricted stock, in addition to cash retainers, meeting fees, committee fees, 
insurance and other fringe benefits.
8
   
While directorships provide substantial benefits, they also entail direct costs in 
terms of time commitment and effort, and indirect costs, primarily reputation risk. 
Directors have a strong incentive to maintain a good reputation as business monitors 
since this may help them secure additional board seats with accompanying compensation 
(Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Research suggests that a director’s reputation is 
directly affected by the performance of the firm. Individuals hold fewer directorships 
after serving in companies that experience financial distress (Gilson, 1990), that are 
acquired (Hartford, 2003), that perform poorly (Yermack, 2004), that experience 
financial statement restatement, especially if the director is a member of the audit 
                                                 
7
 Our analysis focuses exclusively on the resignation of independent directors. Inside directors are excluded 
because of the different incentives related to the resignation decision and the reasons cited for departure. 
Because they are employed by the firm and are typically part of senior management, inside directors have 
less incentive to resign as they receive most of their compensation and prestige from the company. 
Moreover, the legal risks are considerably higher for inside directors in their capacity as senior executives. 
In contrast, independent directors are typically employed by other firms and hold other directorships, hence 
the personal economic impact of resignation is smaller.  
8
 Yermack (2004) estimates that the average annual value of cash retainer and equity-related compensation 
of directors of Fortune 500 companies is around $70,000. Perry (2000) and Linn and Park (2003) calculate 
that the value of the additional array of compensation in the form of meeting fees, committee fees, 
insurance, and other fringe benefits increases the annual compensation by one third. This implies that the 
average annual total compensation for Yermack’s sample is around $90,000. In a more recent survey, 
Meyer and Partners (2002) estimate that director compensation, not including the value of fringe benefits 
and other fees, amounts to $152,000 in the largest 200 companies and $116,000 in the largest 1,000 
companies. 
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committee (Srinivasan, 2005), and that are sued for financial fraud (Fich and Shivdasani, 
2007).
9
  
As indicated, the resignation of an outside director signals that the costs 
associated with the position have come to outweigh the benefits. One potential 
explanation for the increase in costs is past underperformance. Directors of 
underperforming firms may resign in order to limit potential damage to their reputation, 
evade legal liability, or escape the workload associated with restructuring the firm’s 
operations. Alternatively, they may resign as a result of pressure from shareholders. 
Yermack (2004) provides support to this hypothesis, showing that director turnover is 
negatively associated with past equity returns.  
Another explanation for the increase in costs is expected future financial 
performance. The effect of past financial performance on reputation is essentially a sunk 
cost because directors have already incurred the damage to their reputation. Unless the 
resignation is forced by shareholders, they have little incentive to resign if they believe 
the worst is over. If the firm’s performance is expected to recover, then the impact of past 
performance on reputation will be mitigated as the improvement occurs. However, even 
if the firm did not underperform in the past but is expected to underperform in the future, 
then directors still have an incentive to resign in order to avoid potential damage to 
reputation. Consistent with this hypothesis, Asthana and Balsam (2009) find that 
independent directors are more likely to resign when they expect the company to run into 
financial difficulties in the future. Similarly, Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) find that firms 
where independent directors resign unexpectedly have poor stock and accounting 
performance, are more likely to restate earnings, and to be named in a federal class action 
securities fraud lawsuit in the period subsequent to the resignation.  
While previous research findings suggest that a director's reputation is affected by 
the performance of the firm and that directors are more likely to depart following weak 
                                                 
9
 Another potential indirect cost is the risk of litigation, in particular out-of-pocket liability risk. However, 
Black, Cheffins and Klausner (2009) find that incidences of out-of-pocket liability for independent 
directors are rare. Director’s nominal liability is almost entirely eliminated by a combination of 
indemnification, insurance, procedural rules, and the settlement incentives of plaintiffs, defendants, and 
insurers. The principal liability risk comes from an insolvent company (which can neither pay damages 
itself nor indemnify the director) with one or more very wealthy (hence, worth chasing) directors, where 
damages exceed the insurance policy limits.  
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operating performance and when the firm is expected to underperform in the future, we 
conjecture that the association between the likelihood of departure and future operating 
performance is moderated by the extent of reputation risk. Specifically, directors with a 
higher reputation to conserve are more likely to depart when expecting (rather than 
following) weak operating performance simply because the penalty in terms of their 
reputation is expected to be greater. Hence, our first set of hypotheses is: 
 
H1a: The likelihood of departure following weak past performance does not 
increase with reputation 
 
H1b:  The likelihood of departure provided expected weak future performance  
increases with reputation 
 
 
2.2 Information Content of Reasons for Departure, or Lack Thereof 
Following the change in 8-K disclosure requirements issued by the SEC in March 
2004, firms are required to immediately report resignations by directors and disclose the 
reasons as provided by the departing director.
10
 If the company is aware that the 
resignation involves disagreement on any matter relating to the company’s operations, 
policies or practices, then the company has to explain the nature of the disagreement. One 
can broadly classify the reasons for departure into two categories – (i) resignations for 
personal reasons not related to concerns about future performance, and (ii) cases where 
the director resigns because of concerns about future performance, perhaps in order to 
protect reputation capital. The first category includes departures related to reasons such 
as health concerns, the mandatory retirement age, acceptance of a ministerial position or 
political candidacy. This category therefore covers resignation cases due to verifiable 
reasons and hence there is little likelihood that the resignation is associated with concerns 
about future performance.  
When directors resign due to concerns about future profitability, they can signal 
their concerns by citing “disagreement”. This sends a clear warning signal about future 
performance because of issues related to the operations or governance of the firm. 
Agrawal and Chen (2009) document a significant negative market reaction to resignation 
                                                 
10
 SEC Release No. 34-49424, Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing 
Date. 
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announcements citing disagreement, and poor operating and stock performance in the 12 
months before and after the resignation. Dewally and Peck (2009) report a significant 
number of bankruptcy cases, higher frequency of internal management changes, and 
increased frequency of adoption of defense mechanisms against takeover following 
resignation citing disagreement. In contrast to Agrawal and Chen (2009), they observe 
positive equity returns in the six months following the resignation.  
However, neither the company nor the director has any incentive to disclose the 
disagreement because it implies direct and indirect costs for the company and the 
director, and no apparent benefit.
11
 The firm has no reason to disclose disagreement 
because this would trigger an economically significant negative market reaction which 
would translate into a direct monetary loss for the departing director, management, and 
remaining directors through their equity ownership, in addition to shareholder 
dissatisfaction. Furthermore, resignation citing disagreement is likely to attract public 
scrutiny of the company, given the perception that directors may have access to 
information not available to the public at large. Public scrutiny may be costly for 
management and the remaining directors for several reasons. First, they will have to 
explain the disagreement and defend the position that led to the resignation. Second, the 
additional scrutiny may uncover other problems within the company. Third, it may have a 
negative impact on the reputation of management and the board if it is found that the 
resignation with disagreement had merit. These costs likely deter companies from 
voluntarily disclosing that a resignation is related to disagreement. Similarly, departing 
directors have no incentive to cite disagreement because the above-mentioned costs are 
likely to undermine their relationship with the company and adversely affect their 
business dealings, as well as jeopardize their future directorship appointments (Marshall, 
2010).
 12
 Hence, if a departure is indeed prompted by concerns about future performance, 
                                                 
11 Firms have to disclose the reasons for the departure as provided by the director. If the director does not 
give a reason for the resignation then the firm’s only obligation is to report the resignation. The exception is 
resignation with disagreement. Companies where the director resigns because of a disagreement have to 
explain the circumstances that led to the resignation and disclose any correspondence from the director 
related to the resignation. 
12
 Arguably, a resignation with disagreement may establish the reputation of the director as a more vigilant 
monitor, as well as distancing the director from a poorly performing firm. However, this may be achieved 
at the expense of future board appointments (for example, where CEOs prefer less vigilant directors who 
will approve, excessive CEO compensation. See Bebchuk and Fried (2006) for a comprehensive discussion 
on the issue of directors and CEO compensation). In such instances, directors are more likely to ignore the 
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directors have an incentive to mask this by providing no reason for the departure, or 
vague notions such as ‘other commitments’ and ‘for personal reasons’.  
On the other hand, disguising the true reason for resignation may involve the legal 
liability of the company as well as of the director. Directors have a fiduciary duty to 
disclose fully and fairly all material information when shareholder action is required. The 
traditional view of the disclosure duty focuses on whether shareholders receive all 
material information required for their actions, and whether it is communicated in a 
balanced and truthful manner. In Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998), the 
Delaware Supreme Court expanded the disclosure duty, stating that directors violate their 
disclosure duty when they knowingly disseminate false information that results in 
damage to an individual stockholder, even if no action by shareholders is required. 
Further, shareholders have a right to be able to rely upon the truthfulness of all 
information disseminated to them by the directors (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP 
1999). However, what constitutes disagreement is poorly defined, and given the 
incentives of both the director and company to hide any disagreement, as well as the 
myriad reasons available to explain the resignation, it would be hard to prove that the 
director actually resigned because of disagreement when a more opaque explanation is 
given. Moreover, independent directors generally face limited legal liability since legal 
procedures are often costly and ineffective, and various mechanisms can be used to avoid 
legal penalties (see Fairfax, 2005 and Black et al. , 2005) for a comprehensive review of 
the legal risks faced by independent directors).  
We examine the information content of the departure disclosure by analyzing the 
association between the reason for the resignation and the reaction of investors and 
analysts to the announcement. We also examine the relation between subsequent firm 
performance and the reasons for the departure. We posit that the reaction by investors and 
analysts to the reported reason for resignation predictably depends on the extent to which 
the reported reason is verifiable or reliable (Mercer, 2004; Hutton, Miller and Skinner, 
2003). Disagreement and Investigation are two clear cases where the reason itself 
conveys negative news, and moreover is unlikely to be misrepresented, so there is no 
                                                                                                                                                 
poor performance of the CEO, approve other perquisites and engage in other non-shareholder value-
maximizing activities (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). 
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tension in these cases and the expectation in both cases is that the market will respond 
negatively to these reported reasons (dubbed ‘Verifiable-Negative’).13 The second 
category includes verifiable reasons that have no directional implications for the future 
performance of the firm (labeled 'Verifiable-Neutral'). This category includes resignation 
for health reasons, mandatory retirement age, and a subset of ‘Outside Commitments’ and 
‘Personal Reasons’ where details about outside commitments and personal circumstances 
are expressly revealed and detailed, thus rendering them verifiable.
14,15
 The third 
category, ‘Non-Verifiable’, includes all resignation cases classified as ‘No Reason’. We 
also include in this category all resignations citing ‘Outside Commitments’ and ‘Personal 
Reasons’ where no additional information about outside activities and personal 
circumstances are disclosed, rendering them vague or undefined and thus unverifiable 
and less credible reasons (see Appendix A for examples). This third category potentially 
includes resignations due to concerns about future performance that the director chose to 
mask by providing an unverifiable reason for the departure. The discussion above leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
 
 H2:  Investors and analysts react negatively to non-verifiable resignations 
16
  
 
To the extent that a non-verifiable resignation provides a signal that the director 
potentially has concerns about the future performance of the firm, the reaction by 
investors to the resignation announcement is likely to be related to current operating 
performance and the information environment of the firm. Non-verifiable resignations 
following poor operating performance are more likely to be perceived as untruthful and 
send a stronger signal of weak future performance than resignations following strong 
operating performance. Similarly, the reaction also depends on the information 
                                                 
13
 We note that while in the case of a departure with disagreement, the implications reflect negatively on 
the firm, in the case of an investigation against a director it reflects first and foremost on the director 
herself/himself. Our sample contains only five cases of the latter. 
14
 Examples include appointment of a director or his/her spouse to political office which required 
resignation. 
15
 Departure for any of these reasons can lead to either positive or negative reaction. For example, departure 
attributed to age can be a negative signal because the departing director is likely to have significant 
experience and knowledge of the company and industry, or it can be a positive signal to the extent that the 
director was less effective given her age. 
16
 Note that investors' and analysts' reaction to Verifiable-Negative resignations is expected to be 
unambiguously negative, whereas we do not expect a reaction to Verifiable-Neutral resignations. Hence, 
we do not specify hypotheses related to these two categories.  
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environment. Since the source of investor concern about the true reason for director 
departure is lack of information about the true health and prospects of the firm, we expect 
the information environment of the firm to be a moderating factor in the reaction of 
investors to resignation announcements. Hence, our hypothesis: 
 
H3:  The investor reaction to non-verifiable resignations will depend on 
current operating performance and the information environment of the 
firm. 
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
We obtain data on resignations of independent directors from Director and Officer 
Change database of Audit Analytics. Since disclosure of the reasons for director 
departures was not mandatory prior to 2004, our sample starts in 2004.
 17,18
  
We apply several filters to the data to ensure that our sample is meaningful and to 
facilitate empirical analysis. Firms are required to have valid Compustat and CRSP 
information prior to the filing date, valid board and director information from Boardex, 
and we retain departures of independent directors only. In addition, we restrict the 
number of business days between the announcement date (8-K filing date) and the 
                                                 
17
 The change in 8-K disclosure requirements (Release No. 34-49424, Additional Form 8-K Disclosure 
Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date) issued by the SEC in March 2004, became effective on 
August 23, 2004. Results are substantially unaffected by the exclusion of year 2004 observations. 
18
 The new rule significantly increased the number of events to be reported in 8-K filings, and shortened the 
time period required to disclose these events to no more than 4 business days after the occurrence of the 
event. See Lerman and Livnat (2010) for a more detailed description of the changes to Form 8-K, and their 
impact on the value relevance of these filings and on financial statements in general. One of the changes to 
the 8-K relates to departure or election of directors and departure or appointment of principal officers, 
which are reported in Section 5.02 of the form. The change to the Section requires firms to report 
immediately resignation by directors and to disclose the reasons for the departure as provided by the 
departing director. If the company is aware that the resignation involves disagreement on any matter 
relating to the company’s operations, policies or practices, then the company has to explain the nature of 
the disagreement. Prior to the change, departure of directors was reported under Item 6. Former Item 6 
required disclosure of departure of directors only if all the following conditions applied: the director 
resigned as a result of disagreement, provided a letter of resignation describing the disagreement, and 
requested the company to publicly disclose the matter. Thus, the incidence of director departures reported 
under former Item 6 was limited to departures due to disagreement where the director specifically asked to 
disclose the nature of the disagreement. Given the limited scope of departures reported under former Item 6 
and the discretion afforded to directors with respect to the disclosure related to the resignation, one could 
not examine the market reaction to resignation announcements that did not involve disagreement. The new 
rule also allows an analysis of the information content of the reasons for the departure as provided by the 
director. 
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effective date of departure to be no more than four days, as the new SEC disclosure rule 
requires firms to disclose resignation by officers of the firm not more than four working 
days after the event.
19
 We also exclude departures related to M&A, spinoffs, bankruptcy 
and restructuring because the reaction to these departures could be attributed to the event 
itself. These restrictions result in a sample of 5,647 filings by 2,916 firms from 2004 to 
2012. Table 1, Panel A describes the data restrictions and their effect on the total number 
of filings in our sample. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B tabulates the number of filings on a year-by-year basis. The number of 
filings varies from 363 to 884. The highest number of filings is observed in 2007, which 
corresponds to the onset of the global financial crisis, consistent with our conjecture that 
independent directors are likely to resign when they anticipate negative performance in 
order to maintain their reputation capital.  
Panel C provides descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this study. We 
compute announcement returns over the window encompassed by event days (-4,1), 
where day 0 is the filing date provided by Audit Analytics. We use Carhart’s (1997) four-
factor model to calculate benchmark returns and estimate model parameters over a 200-
day period from event day -210 to event day -11. Our focus on an event window, from -4 
to 1, is motivated by the possibility that there is potential information leakage from the 
effective date of departure until the filing date and a wider window allows us to capture 
the full impact of the event. Mean returns during the six-day window encompassing the 
date of the 8-K report are -0.47%, indicating a statistically and economically significant 
negative market reaction to resignations of independent directors. Abnormal returns in 
the year prior to the resignation are significantly negative, with a mean (median) of  
-6.82% (-3.24%), indicating that independent directors resign following sub-par 
performance, consistent with the evidence in Yermack (2004). Moreover, returns in the 
                                                 
19
 Firms may file Form 8-K stating director’s future intention of departure, in which case the filing date will 
predate the effective date of departure. Given the rare occurrence of such events (2.3% of the sample), we 
further exclude these cases. Results are not affected by this criterion. 
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year following the resignation are also significantly negative, with mean and median of  
-6.26% and -1.65%, respectively. The negative returns in the year after the resignation 
support our conjecture that independent directors may resign not only after but also in 
anticipation of poor future firm performance. The operating performance of the sample 
firms is consistent with the negative market returns; the mean industry-adjusted ROA and 
operating cash flows in the most recent fiscal year ending before (after) the resignation 
date are significantly negative at -6.55% (-5.85%) and -0.87% (-1.39%), respectively.  
The average age of the departing director is around 60, and average tenure on the 
board is approximately nine years. The departing director holds on average 0.6 additional 
board seats (as an independent director). Close to 20% of the departing directors serve on 
the audit committee and 17% on the nomination or compensation committee. About 22% 
of the departure cases involve more than one independent director. In 9% (35%) of the 
departure filings the company announced the appointment of a new executive (new 
independent director). 
Board characteristics indicate that the average board size is nine members, 
including insiders. The CEO is the chairman of the board in approximately 46% of the 
cases. Less than 3% of the boards are categorized as busy, where busyness is defined 
following Fich and Shivdasani (2006).
20
 The average firm age, measured as the number 
of years since the IPO, is 19 years, with mean total assets of 4,331 million dollars. 
 
IV. Results 
 
Likelihood of Departure 
Before testing the hypothesis that the reasons for the departure provided by 
director are suspect—primarily in cases where directors potentially resign in order to 
protect their reputation capital—we first examine whether reputable directors are more 
likely to resign when they foresee poor operating performance, consistent with an attempt 
to maintain their reputation capital. We estimate the following model: 
 
                                                 
20
 A board is busy if more than 50% of the independent directors hold more than 3 board memberships. 
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Departure Dummyi,y,t  =  a0+a1*Reputationt,y,t + a2* Negative_Performancey,t+ 
a3* Negative_Performancey,t+1 + a4*Reputationt,y,t*Performancey,t+ 
a5*Reputationt,y,t*Performancey,t+1 + Controlst,y,t+ firm and Year 
Effects+εit, 
 
The model is estimated at the director-firm-year level conditional on resignation 
by at least one independent director. Specifically, the observations include all the 
independent directors of firm-years where at least one of the independent directors 
resigned in that particular year. The dependent variable is Departure Dummy which takes 
the value of 1 if director i of firm y resigned in year t and zero otherwise. The 
independent variables include proxies for reputation, negative future performance and 
negative past performance indicators, interaction variable of reputation with both future 
and past negative performance indicators, and controls. We test whether directors with a 
high reputation are more likely to resign when they foresee negative future performance 
based on the sign of a5. Specifically, a positive and significant coefficient indicates that 
directors with a high reputation are more likely to resign when they anticipate negative 
future performance. Similarly, we test whether reputation is related to the decision to 
resign following weak performance based on the sign of a4. Following H1b we expect 
the coefficient will not be different from zero. 
We measure director reputation using the log of number of outside board 
positions held by the director in one specification and an indicator with 1 if the director 
holds more than one directorship in a second specification. Using the number of board 
seats as a proxy for reputation capital is consistent with the extant literature on director 
reputation (e.g., Gilson, 1990; Ferris et al., 2003; Yermack, 2004); directors who hold 
more than one directorship are considered to have higher reputation capital. We cannot 
observe directors’ expectations for future performance. However, since directors are 
privy to private information, it is reasonable to assume that they are able, at minimum, to 
foresee whether the firm is likely to show positive or negative profitability in the coming 
period. Hence, Negative_Performancet+1 is an indicator equal to 1 if ROA in year t+1 is 
negative and zero otherwise. We define Negative_Performancet indicator based on the 
sign of ROA in year t. 
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The control variables include other factors that are likely to be associated with the 
likelihood of departure such as the tenure of the director and an indicator for age greater 
than 69, since for many companies the mandatory retirement age is 70. We do not include 
additional firm-level controls such as board size and market value of equity. This is 
because the regressions are estimated at the director-firm-year level and hence adding 
firm-level controls induces a high correlation across observations. Furthermore, firm and 
year fixed effects are likely to capture yearly firm-level effects such as size. We cluster 
the standard errors at firm level to account for possible serial correlations. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2, Column 1 (Column 2) shows the results where reputation is measured as 
an indicator (continuous) variable based on the number independent directorships. In both 
specifications we observe that the likelihood of departure by independent directors is 
positively associated with reputation, indicating that reputable directors are more likely to 
resign unconditionally—perhaps because they have other board alternatives and 
consequently a lower relative cost of departure compared with directors who hold only 
one directorship position. Although not statistically significant, the positive coefficient on 
negative future performance suggests that the likelihood of departure is consistent with 
our conjecture that directors are more likely to resign when they foresee weak future 
operating performance. More importantly, the coefficient on the interaction variable of 
reputation and negative future operating performance indicator is positive and significant 
at 10% or better in both specifications, indicating that the likelihood of departure given 
negative future operating performance increases with reputation. This result provides 
support to the hypothesis (H1b) that reputable directors are more likely to resign when 
they foresee weak operating performance in order to protect their reputation capital. 
Consistent with the findings in Yermack (2004), we find that the likelihood of departure 
increases with past negative profitability (p-value<0.01). However, the interaction of past 
negative profitability and reputation is negative and not significant, supporting the second 
part of the hypothesis (H1a). These findings are consistent with the conjecture that the 
effect of past financial performance on reputation is essentially a sunk cost because 
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directors have already incurred the damage to their reputation. Reputable directors have 
little incentive to resign if they believe the worst is over because subsequent 
improvement in the firm's performance is likely to mitigate the impact of past 
performance on reputation. The coefficients on the other control variables suggest that 
the likelihood of departure increases with age and tenure (p-value<0.01). Taken together, 
the results indicate that the likelihood of departures increases unconditionally with 
reputation and past negative profitability. In addition, the results are consistent with the 
notion that director departures are at least partially motivated by the preservation of 
reputational capital when poor firm performance is anticipated.
21
 
 
Performance and Reason for Departure 
Table 3, Panel A tabulates the number of filings by departure reasons and shows 
performance statistics for each category of departure reasons. There are 84 resignations 
resulting from Disagreement with senior management and 5 cases stating that the director 
is under investigation by internal or external parties (e.g. SEC).
22
  In 3,487 cases (61% of 
our sample) No Reason is provided for the resignation.  In 694 cases directors cite 
Outside Commitments as the reason for departure, and in 1,377 cases directors indicate 
that the departure is related to health, retirement or personal reasons. The most striking 
statistic is the low incidence of Disagreement cases (only about 1.6% of all departures). 
Although there is no benchmark against which to test the number of resignations with 
disagreement, it appears to be very low compared with the frequency of the other 
categories. Put differently, if directors and firms are fully compliant and forthcoming 
with respect to disclosing the reasons for departure, this statistic suggests that 98.4% of 
director resignations take place when the director agrees with management on all matters 
                                                 
21
 Another interpretation of the results is that since outside board membership is indicative of more 
experience or skill (see, e.g. Rubin and Segal, 2013), departure by multi-board directors can cause poor 
operating performance in subsequent periods. While plausible, the results indicate that director departures 
are also preceded by negative performance. This suggests that having skilled and experienced directors on 
the board does not prevent poor operating performance. Hence, the reverse causality argument cannot fully 
explain our results. 
22
 Agrawal and Chen (2009) examine disputes involving disagreement for both inside and independent 
directors. Although they do not provide the exact number of disagreements involving independent 
directors, one can infer that the number in their sample is approximately 35 for 2005-2006. Our sample 
consists of 32 cases for the same period. 
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“relating to the registrant’s operations, policies or practices”.23 This finding is consistent 
with directors being reluctant to cite disagreement since such a departure may be costly to 
the director as it could adversely affect their business connections and portray them as 
trouble-makers. In contrast, the number of departures where no explanation for the 
resignation is given (approximately 61% of all cases) appears to be high.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Short window returns are negative and significant for Disagreement, 
Investigation, No Reason and Outside Commitments, suggesting that the market views 
them all as conveying negative news, regardless of the reason cited or lack thereof. At the 
same time, when the stated reason for departure is Personal (i.e. health, personal reasons 
or retirement), the immediate market reaction is not significantly different from zero, 
indicating that the market views the former set of reasons as indicating or masking 
concerns about future performance, while the latter is seemingly viewed as reliably 
benign. 
Examination of the preceding and following yearly abnormal returns indicates an 
average negative and significant return only for the potentially evasive No Reason and 
Outside Commitments categories. However, excess past and future profitability is 
negative and significant for all categories except Investigation and Personal, and excess 
past and future cash flows are also negative and significant for most categories. Hence, 
except for the Personal category, the results suggest that director resignations are 
associated with poor past and future operating performance regardless of the reasons for 
the departure, and provide additional support to the hypothesis that directors who resign 
because of concerns about future performance may choose to mask the reason.  
We further investigate the issue of seemingly benign resignation reasons by 
partitioning the reasons for departure into two groups based on how reliable and 
verifiable the reason signal is, compared with the alternative base notion that it is 
                                                 
23
 Item 5.02 requires knowledge by management of such disagreement on the part of the departing 
directors. Thus, to avoid stating disagreement as the cause of departure (when indeed disagreement exists), 
the resigning director must either conceal their disagreement altogether, or refrain from making their 
disagreement formally registered allowing management to avoid its acknowledgement. Either scenario, 
suggests breach of fiduciary duty and role as board members (see discussion in Section II). 
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prompted by personal incentives related to effort aversion or preservation of reputational 
capital in anticipation of poor performance (Mercer, 2004; Hutton, Miller and Skinner, 
2003). In particular, Disagreement and Investigation are two clear cases where the reason 
per se conveys negative news and is unlikely to be misrepresented, so there is no tension 
in such cases. A director has no incentive to report Disagreement when the resignation is 
not associated with disagreement. In contrast, the No Reason category is classified as 
non-verifiable given the lack of information about the reason for departure. To be able to 
classify the departures related to Outside Commitments and Personal into the verifiable 
and non-verifiable categories, we supplement the Audit Analytics database classifications 
by additional verification of the original Form 8-K where the resignation is announced. 
We classify departure due to Personal or Outside Commitment as verifiable if details 
about personal or outside commitments are revealed. For example, resignations attributed 
to Health are classified as verifiable because health is less likely to be cited 
opportunistically as it reduces the likelihood of additional employment and is to a large 
extent verifiable. Retirement is classified as verifiable where the director will be 69 or 
more in the year following the departure, and is otherwise considered non-verifiable (the 
classification of Retirement in Audit Analytics does not correspond to mandatory 
retirement but rather to all filing language stating ‘retirement from the board’, in the 
sense of ‘leaving’ or ‘stepping down’ - see example in Appendix A). Personal Reasons 
(unless specific information is provided) are highly ambiguous and may easily be used 
opportunistically. Outside Commitments are also ambiguous and vague so we choose to 
classify these resignations as non-verifiable except for 11 cases where the director clearly 
states that the Outside Commitment is related to political nomination or candidacy.  
Table 3, Panel B provides the frequency of departure cases by verifiability. In 
total, we have 1,272 (4,375) departure cases that are classified as verifiable (non-
verifiable). 
Table 3, Panel C shows the performance statistics by verifiability category. 
Because the verifiable cases include Disagreement and Investigation categories—obvious 
negative news—whereas the remaining reasons for departure in this category like Health 
or Personal Reasons have no negative implication, we further partition our ‘verifiable’ 
group into ‘Verifiable-Neutral’ and ‘Verifiable-Negative’. The performance metrics for 
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the non-verifiable category are uniformly negative, indicating that non-verifiable 
resignations are preceded and followed by negative operating performance as well as 
stock returns. In contrast, the performance measures are not significantly different from 
zero for the Verifiable-Neutral group, consistent with the notion that such departures are 
not associated with past performance or convey negative signal about future performance. 
Comparing the performance statistics across the Verifiable-Neutral and Non-Verifiable 
groups, we find that the performance measures of the latter group are significantly more 
negative with p-values mostly less than 5%. Although verifiable, Disagreement and 
Investigation are two clear cases where the reason per se conveys negative news 
(Verifiable-Negative) and the short-term announcement return is indeed significantly 
negative at -2.3%. Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly, the Verifiable-Negative group 
is not as uniformly or significantly negative as the seemingly benign Non-Verifiable 
group; Disagreement and Investigation do not tend to be preceded nor followed by 
negative annual abnormal returns, although past and future profitability is negative and 
significant (cash flows are negative but not significant).  
We further examine the association between the reason for departure and each of 
returns around the announcement date and in the year following the resignation, using 
multivariate regressions. To avoid the problem of full rank, we use Verifiable-Neutral 
departures (due to Health, Retirement, or verifiable Personal and Other Commitments) as 
the holdout group, since this category of resignations attracts no market reaction. The 
independent variables include the resignation category dummies (Disagreement, No 
Reason, Commitment, and Personal). In addition, we include director, governance and 
firm characteristics. We cluster standard errors at firm level to account for serial 
correlations. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]  
 
Column (1) of Table 4 provides results of the short-window announcement 
returns regression. With the exception of the Personal category, the coefficients on the 
resignation categories are all negative and significant. While the negative coefficient on 
the Disagreement category is expected, the negative coefficient on the No Reason and 
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Outside Commitments resignation categories indicates that investors seem to interpret 
both as a signal of bad news about the firm. The coefficient on the Personal Reasons 
category is negative but not different from zero.
24
 A possible interpretation of this is that 
investors seem to give the benefit of the doubt in cases where personal reasons are cited. 
Additional tests with respect to future abnormal returns indicate that this trust may not be 
merited. The coefficients on the control variables indicate that returns are more negative 
when more than one director resigns. The negative market reaction is mitigated when the 
company announces the appointment of a new independent director in the same filing, or 
when the director's tenure is long.  
Column (2) of Table 4 replicates the regression in Column (1) using future one-
year abnormal returns as the dependent variable. The purpose of this regression is to 
examine whether investors under- or overreact to the resignation announcement during 
the event window. If investors did not over or underreact during the event window then 
we should observe that the coefficients on the resignation categories are not different 
from zero. Results indicate that the coefficients on the Disagreement and No Reason 
categories are not significantly different from zero, implying that the negative market 
reaction to these categories during the event window was accurate. However, the 
coefficient on the Outside Commitments and Personal categories are negative and 
significant at 10%, indicating that investors underreact to these categories of resignations 
during the event window. Put differently, although departures for personal reasons do not 
elicit an immediate negative response from the market, the future one-year abnormal 
returns suggest that such firms underperform the market. The results are consistent with 
the interpretation that directors are not truthful about their departure reasons and the 
market makes partial inferences from the stated reasons.  
Our next set of analyses further investigates the association between departure 
reasons and short-window announcement returns while examining the effects of 
concurrent operating performance and the information environment on this association. 
Because investors likely respond negatively to unverifiable departure reasons for fear that 
they signal poor future performance, we hypothesize that departures announced during 
                                                 
24
 In untabulated results, we look at alternative event windows (CAR[-4,4], CAR[-4,0] and CAR[-1,1]) and 
we obtain very similar results 
 22 
 
‘good times’ are less likely to entail a negative market reaction even when the stated 
reason is less credible. Put differently, given that performance is correlated at least in the 
short term, resignation following a negative operating performance is more likely to 
signal future negative operating performance than a resignation following positive 
performance. Furthermore, we expect the reaction to the resignation categories to depend 
on the information environment of the firm. Since the source of investor concern about 
the true reason for director departure is lack of information about the true prospects of the 
firm, we expect the information environment of the firm to be a moderating factor in the 
reaction of investors to resignation announcements.  
We examine empirically the moderating impact of the concurrent operating 
performance and information environment by including interaction variables of the 
resignation categories with concurrent profitability and analysts following respectively. 
To the extent that these factors indeed moderate investors' reaction, the coefficient on the 
interaction variables are expected to be positive.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]  
 
Table 5 presents the regression results. Column 1 shows the results where we 
include interaction terms of the resignation categories and profitability (log(1+ROA)). As 
reported in Table 4, with the exception of Personal Reasons, the coefficient on the 
resignation categories is negative and significant. More importantly, with the same 
exception for Personal Reasons, the coefficient on the interaction variables of the 
resignation categories with profitability are all positive and significant, indicating that 
current operating performance positively affects the market reaction to director 
departures. Similarly, the interaction of information environment proxy—the number of 
analysts following—with the departure categories is positive for all categories, though 
significant only for the No Reason and Personal Reasons categories, indicating that a 
better information environment reduces the uncertainty associated with the signal related 
to the resignation and therefore mitigates a negative investor reaction. 
 
 
 23 
 
Analysts Reaction to Directors' Departure 
The results thus far indicate that investors react negatively to departures and the 
reaction is more negative if the reason provided by the director is non-verifiable. They 
also suggest that the reaction is affected by current operating performance and the 
information environment of the firm. In this sub-section, we examine analysts’ reaction to 
director resignations and the reason provided. Given that financial analysts are adept at 
information gathering and interpretation, they understand the incentive for departing 
directors not to reveal concerns about future performance and can potentially see through 
the opaque justifications given for departure. Moreover, analysts are better equipped to 
assemble the pieces in the mosaic of firm-related information and translate their 
implications into tangible forecasts. Therefore we explore the occurrence and direction of 
analyst forecast revisions following director departures and their association with 
departure reasons.  
One obstacle is the evidence in Rubin et al. (2013) which suggests analysts tend 
not to react to non-financial information such as director resignations. In particular, they 
find that, on average, analysts react to only 38% of all non-financial events reported on 
form 8-K. Their results are puzzling because the low reaction relates to non-financial 
events that trigger a significant market reaction. Nevertheless, the authors provide 
evidence that analysts who react to non-financial information are more skillful. We 
therefore focus on the group of analysts that react to resignation announcements.  
Since analysis is conditional on the reaction, and resignation by directors 
represents negative news, we expect a priori that the reaction is on average negative. 
However, if analysts take the reasons for resignation at face value then we expect 
variation in the likelihood of reaction across categories and in the sign of the reaction. In 
particular, there should be lower likelihood and less negative reaction to all categories in 
comparison to the Disagreement category. Finding a similar frequency of reaction across 
categories as well as analysts revising forecasts downwards regardless of the reason for 
departure would provide further evidence that market participants do not take the reason 
cited at face value.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]  
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Table 6, Panel A provides descriptive statistics. Since Audit Analytics, the main 
source of the departures sample, includes smaller firms, not all firms in our sample are 
covered by IBES. To be included in the sample we require at least one forecast of current 
fiscal year earnings prior to the departure filing. Out of the 5,647 filings in our sample, 
3,987 resignations are by directors of firms covered by IBES. Of the 3,987 resignations, 
we identify 1,054 resignations that triggered a current fiscal year forecast revision by at 
least one analyst. We define 'reaction' to resignation if the forecast revision occurs 
between the event date and 6 days after the filing date.
25
 We find that analysts react to 
approximately 26% of the resignation cases. Our findings are consistent with those of 
Rubin et al. (2013) and suggest that for most resignation cases there is no analyst 
reaction. Looking across the resignation categories, we observe that the reaction to the 
benign categories is similar to the sample average, yet the reaction to resignations citing 
disagreement is only approximately 16%. To the extent that analysts’ reaction to 
disagreements represents a benchmark for reaction to resignations with a clear negative 
signal by the director regarding future performance, the stronger reaction to supposedly 
benign resignations indicates that analysts do not take the reasons cited at face value.  
Column 4 shows that the average number of analysts following the firm is around 
9 and is similar across the resignation categories. Column 5 shows the total number of 
revisions for each category, and Column 6 provides the proportion of analysts who 
reacted to the news. For example, there were 54 resignation cases with disagreement in 
firms covered by IBES. Of the 54 cases, 9 cases (17%) elicit forecast revision by at least 
one analyst. Interestingly, the proportion of resignations that resulted in forecast revisions 
for the entire sample is much higher at 26% (1,054 revisions out of 3,987 resignations), 
as are the proportions for each of the other reason categories, ranging from 26% to 29%. 
The number or proportion of analysts who reacted is another useful indicator. The 
average number of analysts following the firms where disagreement was cited is 7.89, so 
the maximum number of potential revisions in reaction to these 9 cases is 71. However, 
the total number of revisions amounted to 27, indicating that only 38% of the analysts 
                                                 
25
 We initially chose 3 days after the filing date as the cutoff date. However, more than 400 revisions occur 
between day 4 and 6 after the filing date. Given the limited sample size, we decided to use the 6 days 
cutoff. The results are similar when we use the 3 days cutoff.  
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covering firms that reported resignation citing disagreement reacted. The proportion of 
analysts who reacted to the news is an additional measure of the importance of the 
resignation event. Resignation events with stronger implications for future earnings 
should elicit a greater reaction frequency. Indeed, while the average proportion for the 
full sample is 31%, disagreement cases elicit reactions by 38% of the analysts. However, 
Outside Commitments elicit an even higher proportion of reactions (40%), and the 
average proportion of reacting analysts to the other two categories is around 30%. Taken 
together, these results indicate that resignations citing benign reasons are more likely to 
generate forecast revisions than those citing disagreement. Moreover, the proportion of 
analysts who react to resignations with disagreement is lower than that for the seemingly 
benign Outside Commitments, though higher than the proportion of analysts who react to 
the Personal Reasons and No Reason categories.  
Column 7 shows the average change in the forecast. We compute the change in 
the forecast as the ratio of the change in the forecast (new forecast minus previous 
forecast) to the absolute value of the previous forecast. A negative sign indicates 
downward revision. On average, resignations elicit strong negative (-22%) and 
statistically significant revision (p-value<0.01). We also observe a negative reaction 
across the various categories, and the reaction is significant for the No Reason and 
Outside Commitments categories (p-value<0.01). The reaction to the Disagreement 
category is marginally significant (p-value=0.116), and the reaction to the Personal 
category, which includes many verifiable resignations, is not statistically significant.   
Table 6, Panel B shows the distribution of resignation cases that triggered forecast 
revision and the mean revision for the Verifiable Neutral, Verifiable Negative, and non-
verifiable categories. The non-verifiable category includes all No Reason cases and all 
Outside Commitments cases except for one verifiable case. Of the 281 Personal cases in 
the sample, 38 are classified as non-verifiable and 243 as verifiable. The Personal cases 
in the former category induce negative and marginally significant reaction (p-
value=0.115), whereas the reaction to those cases in the latter category is not significantly 
different from zero as expected. Overall, consistent with the reaction by investors, 
analysts do not take the reason cited, or lack thereof, at face value. Non-verifiable 
departures send a negative signal to the market while Verifiable-Neutral departures 
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(personal reasons such as retirement due to age or health issues) are not followed by a 
significant change in the forecast.
26
  
Panel C of Table 6 shows the results of a multivariate analysis where the 
dependent variable is the average forecast revision for the resignation. The sample 
comprises resignations that elicit at least one reaction. The holdout group consists of 
verifiable departures that are due to Health, Personal and Retirement (Verifiable-Neutral 
group). Negative and significant coefficients on all non-verifiable categories, namely No 
Reason, Outside Commitments and Personal Reasons would be consistent with a negative 
interpretation of these departures. Surprisingly, one of the coefficients—for the 
Disagreement indicator—though negative, is not significant. One potential explanation is 
the small number of resignations with disagreement in this subsample (9). Hence, these 
results are consistent with the univariate analysis and indicate that non-verifiable reasons 
for resignations are considered to be a negative signal.  
 
V. Conclusions 
 
In this investigation of the information content of the reasons cited by 
independent directors for resignation, our main hypothesis is that directors have an 
incentive to disguise the true reason for the resignation in so far as it is related to 
concerns about future performance of the firm. Citing disagreement with management on 
any issue related to the operation or policies of the firm come at a significant cost to the 
director and the firm, due to the potentially adverse effect on the director’s equity 
holding, business relations, and future directorship opportunities. 
We show that directors with a high reputation are more likely to resign in 
anticipation of weak future performance. Consistent with previous research, we find that 
the departure of independent directors elicits an immediate negative market reaction and 
is associated with poor financial and operating performance in the year before as well as 
after the resignation. However, these results hold only for cases where there is ambiguity 
                                                 
26
 Verifiable-Neutral resignations may provide a positive signal especially if the departing director is 
expected to be replaced by a more effective director. Such cases are expected if the departing director 
leaves for health or age reasons.  
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or difficulty in verifying the true motive for departure. Our results support the notion that 
investors are aware of the personal incentive for directors to distance themselves from a 
poor performing firm, and thus regard the explanation for the departure with 
circumspection. Moreover, the gap in information vis-a-vis investors is a significant 
driver of negative market reactions to such resignations. Conversely, concurrent positive 
performance indicators as well as a better information environment may mitigate its 
effects. Corroborating evidence is gleaned from examining how sophisticated participants 
react to director departures: analysts interpret such resignations similarly negatively and 
revise their forecasts downwards in response to seemingly benign departures. 
Our findings imply that some directors, with the tacit agreement of the firm, 
disguise the true motive for resignation when it is related to concerns about future 
performance, for example by citing ‘time constraints’ or not providing a reason.   
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Appendix A 
 
Disagreement (Verifiable) 
 
PRO PHARMACEUTICALS INC, 8-K Date: September 15, 2006 
 
“On September 12, 2006, we received a letter from David H. Smith, one of our directors, 
notifying us of Mr. Smith’s resignation from the Board of Directors of Pro-Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
effective immediately. Mr. Smith was a member of our Compensation Committee. In his letter, 
Mr. Smith indicated that his resignation was due to differences on how the company has been and 
continues to be managed, including our recent financing. A copy of Mr. Smith’s resignation letter 
is filed herewith as Exhibit 17.  
 
Investigation (Verifiable) 
 
EAGLE BROADBAND, INC., 8-K Date: September 15, 2006 
 
“In a special meeting of the Board of Directors held on September 15, 2006, the members of the 
Board of Directors unanimously voted to remove H. Dean Cubley as a director of the Company. 
On August 23, 2006, Mr. Cubley filed a lawsuit against the company for non-payment of a note 
issued by the Company in December 2003. The company believes Mr. Cubley wrongfully 
induced the Board to approve the issuance of the note and intends to vigorously defend the 
lawsuit.” 
 
No Reason (Non-verifiable) 
 
REPLIDYNE INC, 8-K Date: April 19, 2007 
 
“Ralph E. Christoffersen, Ph.D., a member of the board of directors of the Company (the 
“Board”) whose term will expire at the Company’s 2007 annual stockholder meeting (the 
“Annual Meeting”), indicated to the Company on April 13, 2007 that he does not intend to stand 
for re-election at the Annual Meeting. Dr. Christoffersen’s decision not to stand for re-election is 
not due to any disagreement with the Company.” 
 
IMPCO TECHNOLOGIES INC, 8-K Date: January 6, 2006 
 
“On January 5, 2006, Don J. Simplot announced his resignation from the Board of Directors of 
IMPCO Technologies, Inc. effective immediately.” 
 
Outside Commitments (Verifiable) 
 
Reebok International Ltd., 8-K Date: April 24, 2005 
 
“On April 24, 2005, because of the expected demands from his recently announced candidacy for 
Governor of Massachusetts, Deval Patrick, one of the Company’s independent directors, tendered 
his resignation as director.   Mr. Patrick’s resignation was accepted on April 28.  The Company 
does not expect to fill the vacancy immediately and will remove Mr. Patrick from the slate of 
directors to be elected at its upcoming Annual Meeting.” 
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Outside Commitments (Non-verifiable) 
 
AMERICAN MEDICAL SYSTEMS HOLDINGS, INC, 8-K Date: 21 Mar 2006 
 
“On March, 21, 2006, Douglas W. Kohrs, Chairman of the Board of Directors and a director of 
American Medical Systems Holdings, Inc., notified the company that he would not stand for re-
election to the Board of Directors at the 2006 annual meeting of stockholders and that he was 
resigning from the Board effective March 21, 2006 in order to devote his full attention to a new 
business opportunity.” 
 
 
Personal (Verifiable) 
 
CINTAS CORPORATION, 8-K Date: January 24, 2006 
 
“Cintas Corporation Board member Robert J. Herbold resigned from the Board of Directors on 
January 24, 2006 because his wife has been appointed as U.S. Ambassador to Singapore. 
Consequently, Mr. Herbold will be spending a significant amount of time in Asia and unable to 
travel to Cincinnati on a regular basis to attend Cintas Board meetings. The Nominating and 
Governance Committee is engaged in a search for an independent director to replace Mr. 
Herbold.” 
 
 
Personal (Non-verifiable) 
 
ALTEON INC /DE, 8-K Date: November 24, 2006 
 
“On November 17, 2006, George M. Naimark, Ph.D., a member of the Board of Directors of 
Alteon Inc. (the “Company”), notified the Company of his decision to resign as a Director, 
effective immediately, for personal reasons. The Company thanks Dr. Naimark for his important 
contributions throughout the years.” 
 
INFOSPACE, INC., 8-K Date: October 3, 2006 
 
“InfoSpace, Inc. (NASDAQ: INSP) announced today that Rufus W. Lumry, III has 
resigned as a director of InfoSpace, effective October 3, 2006. Mr. Lumry, who has 
served on the board since December 1998, is leaving for personal reasons.” 
 
 
Health (Verifiable) 
 
LAMAR ADVERTISING COMPANY,8-K Date: December 3,2008  
 
“Robert M. Jelenic, a director of Lamar Advertising Company (the “Company”), died on 
December 3, 2008. Mr. Jelenic served as a director of the Company since February 2004 and was 
a member of the Audit Committee.”  
 
WESTMORELAND COAL CO, 8-K Date: January 12, 2006 
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“Pemberton Hutchinson, a member of the Westmoreland Coal Company Board of Directors, has 
submitted his resignation effective January 6, 2006 for reasons related to his health.” 
 
Retirement (Verifiable) 
 
GOTTSCHALKS INC, 8-K Date: April 25, 2005 
 
“Mr. Max Gutmann, age 82, has been a Director of the Company since 1992, and on April 19, 
2005, informed the Company that he intends to resign from the Board of Directors effective May 
1, 2005. The Company is engaged in a search for a replacement who will, among other things, 
meet the independence requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission and The New 
York Stock Exchange.” 
 
Retirement (Non-verifiable)* 
 
 InPhonic, Inc, 8-K Date: October 13, 2006 
 
“On October 9, 2006 Jay C. Hoag notified the Company that he was retiring from the Board of 
Directors effective as of October 13, 2006. Mr. Hoag indicated that his resignation was not the 
result of any disagreement that existed between him and the Company relating to the Company’s 
operations, policies or practices. Mr. Hoag served on the Company’s Board of Directors since 
June 2003”.  
 
* Authors note: these are misclassifications in the Audit Analytics database, where a form 
of the word ‘retire’ was used in the announcement, in the sense of ‘stepping down’, rather 
than reaching retirement age. Mr. Hoag was 52 years old at time of announcement and 
subsequently joined TheStreet.com Inc. as an independent director in 2007. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A tabulates sample losses due to data screening. Panel B tabulates number of departure filings by calendar years. Panel C 
provides sample statistics. ‘CAR[x,y]’ is the cumulative abnormal return calculated over event window x and y, where day 0 is the 
filing date provided by Audit Analytics. We use Carhart (1997) four-factor model to calculate benchmark returns and estimate model 
parameters over 200-day period prior to the event window. ‘Excess past (future) profitability’ is calculated as the industry adjusted 
return on assets in the most recent fiscal year preceding (following) the 8-K filing date. ‘Excess past (future) cash flow’ is the industry 
adjusted operating cash flows scaled by total assets in the most recent fiscal year preceding (following) the 8-K filing date.  Industry 
adjusted variables are computed by subtracting the median of the variable in the same Fama-French 48 industries in the same year. 
‘Tenure’ is number of years directors have been on board.. ‘Age’ is the age of directors. ‘D(Audit/Compensation/Nomination)’ is a 
dummy equal to one if departing director sits on audit/compensation/nomination committee. ‘Independent directorship’ is number of 
independent directorships at other firms. ‘D(Multi Departure)’ is a dummy equal to one if there are multiple departures from the same 
company on the same day. ‘D(Appoint Exe)’ is a dummy equal to one if an executive director is appointed on the same day and 
‘D(Appoint Indep Dir)’ is a dummy equal to one if an independent director is appointed on the same day as departure filing, zero 
otherwise. ‘D(CEO-Chair)’ is a dummy equal to one if CEO is also the chairman of the board. ‘Board Size’ is number of directors. 
‘D(Busy Board)’ is a dummy equal to one if more than 50% of directors hold more than three board memberships. ‘Analyst Coverage’ 
is number of analysts covering the firm in one year, where analyst forecast information is from I/B/E/S. ‘Firm Age’ is the number of 
years from its first appearance on CRSP. ‘Total Asset’ is total assets (Mnemonics ‘at’) ‘ROA’ is income before extraordinary items 
(Mnemonics ‘ib’) over lagged total assets (Mnemonics ‘at’). 
 
Panel A Sample selection and number of filings removed 
 
Starting sample 212,152 
 
filing >=2004 (4,288) 
 
Valid Compustat and CRSP (89,001) 
 
Exclude filings related to non-board member (49,911) 
 
Only independent director (6,525) 
 
Only Departure 
 
(43,840) 
 
Valid board information from Boardex (9,597) 
 
Departure due to M&A, SpinOff, 
Bankruptcy, Resturcturing (3,293) 
 
Effective date and filing date<=4 Business days (50) 
 
Final sample 5,647 
Panel B Number of filings by years 
  
N % 
 
2004 363 6.43 
 
2005 860 15.23 
 
2006 781 13.83 
 
2007 884 15.65 
 
2008 722 12.79 
 
2009 650 11.51 
 
2010 549 9.72 
 
2011 439 7.77 
 
2012 399 7.07 
 
Total 5,647 100 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics Continued 
 
Panel C Summary Statistics 
  
Mean Median Std P25 P75 
ttest of mean=0 
(P value) 
Performance measure 
      
 
CAR[-4,1] -0.47% -0.28% 10.94% -3.47% 2.94% 0.006 
 
CAR[-360,-5] -6.82% -3.24% 98.01% -50.16% 38.73% 0.000 
 
CAR[2,360] -6.26% -1.65% 80.26% -43.89% 37.30% 0.000 
 
Excess past profitability -6.55% -0.09% 30.02% -5.43% 3.42% 0.000 
 
Excess future profitability -5.86% -0.10% 24.63% -5.58% 3.24% 0.000 
 
Excess past cash flow -0.87% 0.09% 14.98% -3.96% 5.54% 0.000 
 
Excess future cash flow -1.39% 0.20% 21.49% -3.92% 5.14% 0.000 
        Director Characteristics 
      
 
Tenure 8.92 6.67 7.66 3.50 11.92 
 
 
Age 59.78 60.50 11.14 51.50 68.33 
 
 
D(Audit) 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 
 
 
D(Nomination) 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 
 
 
D(Compensation) 0.17 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.00 
 
 
IndependentDirectorship 0.61 0.00 0.99 0.00 1.00 
 
 
D(Multi Departure) 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 
 
 
D(Appoint Exe) 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 
 
 
D(Appoint Indep Dir) 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
         Board Characteristics 
      
 
D(CEO-Chair) 0.46 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
 
Board Size 9.26 9.00 2.91 7.00 11.00 
 
 
D(Board Busy) 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 
         Firm Characteristics 
      
 
Analyst Coverage 6.88 4.00 8.29 0.00 11.00 
 
 
Firm Age 18.85 13.00 16.34 8.00 25.00 
 
 
Total Assets 4331 725 12115 169 2593 
  ROA -1.82% 1.45% 16.48% -3.35% 6.42%  
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Table 2: Likelihood of Departure 
 
The table reports results of an estimation of the likelihood of director departure given a measure of their reputation and past and future 
firm performance. The regressions are based on Boardex universe. We include in the sample all independent directors of firm-years 
where at least one of the independent directors resigned during the year. The dependent variable is an indicator with 1 if an 
independent director left the board and zero otherwise. ‘D(Independent directorship>=1)’ is a dummy equal to one if number of 
independent directorships is more than one. ‘Log number of independent directorship’ is log of one plus number of independent 
directorship at other firms. ‘D(Neg ROA,t)’ is a dummy equal to one if ROA is negative in the most recent financial statement prior to 
departure. ‘D(Neg ROA,t+1) is a dummy equal to one if ROA is negative in the year immediately after the director departure filing. 
‘D(Age>69)’ is a dummy equal to one if the age of departing director is more than 69 years old. All the other variables are defined 
under Table 1. Constants are included but not displayed. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at firm 
level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denotes significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
 
  (1) (2) 
Variables D(Leave) D(Leave) 
   D(Outside directorship>1) 0.083 
 
 
(1.650)* 
 Log Number of outside directorship 
 
0.084 
  
(1.681)* 
D(Neg ROA, t) 0.246 0.219 
 
(3.671)*** (3.303)*** 
D(Neg ROA, t+1) 0.087 0.098 
 
(1.299) (1.484) 
D(Outside directorship>1)*D(Neg ROA, t) -0.116 
 
 
(-1.348) 
 D(Outside directorship>1)*D(Neg ROA, t+1) 0.184 
 
 
(2.112)** 
 Log Number of Outside directorship*D(Neg ROA, t) 
 
-0.042 
  
(-0.465) 
Log Number of Outside directorship*D(Neg ROA, t+1) 
 
0.163 
  
(1.863)* 
Tenure 0.012 0.012 
 
(4.649)*** (4.641)*** 
D(Age>69) 0.786 0.785 
 
(14.759)*** (14.735)*** 
   Observations 99,801 99,801 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm 
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Table 3: Univariate Analysis 
 
Panel A tabulates performance measures by departure reasons. Panel B and Panel C tabulates performance measures by verifiability of the stated departure reasons. We read 8-Ks filings to determine 
verifiability and creditability of the stated departure reasons. Examples are provided in Appendix A. All the variables are defined under Table 1. *,**,*** denotes significance level at 10%,5% and 1% 
level. Personal category in Panel A, B and C includes stated departure reasons citing health, personal reasons and retirement. Partitioning of stated departure reasons into ‘Verifiable’ and ‘Non-
verifiable’ for 1,377 cases in Personal category, produces 1,172 cases classified as ‘Verifiable’ (retirement at age of 69, Mandatory retirement and health reasons) and the remaining 205 classified as 
‘Non-verifiable’. 11 cases in Outside Commitment category are verifiable, where details about outside commitments are provided. 
 
 
Panel A Performance by Departure Reasons 
      
 
Disagreement Investigation No Reason 
Outside  
Commitments Personal 
       Number of Obs 84 5 3,487 694 1,377 
                    CAR[-360,-5] 0.081 -0.326 -0.082*** -0.101*** -0.026 
       CAR[-4,1] -0.023*** -0.029** -0.007*** -0.009*** 0.005 
       CAR[2,360] 0.061 0.266 -0.073*** -0.108*** -0.022 
       Excess past profitability -0.130*** -0.247 -0.081*** -0.046*** -0.002 
       Excess future profitability -0.128*** 0.041 -0.078*** -0.060*** -0.006* 
       Excess past cash flow -0.020 -0.059 -0.017*** 0.011** 0.005 
       Excess future cash flow -0.085* 0.023 -0.016** -0.019 -0.001 
             
Panel B Verifiable vs. Non-verifiable Departure 
      
 
All Sample Verifiable Non-verifiable 
      
 
N % N % N % 
      Disagreement 84 1.49 84 6.60 0 0.00 
      Investigation 5 0.09 5 0.39 0 0.00 
      No Reason 3,487 61.75 0 0.00 3,487 79.70 
      Outside Commitments 694 12.29 11 0.86 683 15.61 
      Personal (Personal/Retirement/Health) 1,377 24.38 1,172 92.14 205 4.69 
      Total 5,647 100 1,272 100 4,375 100.00 
             
Panel C Performance by Verifiable vs. Non-verifiable Departure 
 
1. Verifiable-Neutral 
(Personal, Retirement, Health, 
Commitments) 
 
2. Verifiable-Negative 
(Disagreement, Investigation) 
 
 
3. Non-verifiable 
(No Reason, 
Commitments, Personal) 
 
Test of 
diff.  
between 
1 and 2 
Test of 
diff.  
between 
1 and 3 
Test of 
diff.  
between 
2 and 3 
 
N Mean 
 
N Mean 
 
N Mean 
 
P value P value P value 
CAR[-360,-5] 1183 -0.039 
 
89 0.058 
 
4375 -0.079*** 
 
0.325 0.089 0.205 
CAR[-4,1] 1183 0.005 
 
89 -0.023*** 
 
4375 -0.007*** 
 
0.038 0.001 0.136 
CAR[2,360] 1183 -0.004 
 
89 0.073 
 
4375 -0.081*** 
 
0.376 0.004 0.073 
Excess past profitability 1130 -0.001 
 
89 -0.134*** 
 
4325 -0.081*** 
 
0.000 0.000 0.113 
Excess future profitability 1047 -0.005 
 
76 -0.119*** 
 
3817 -0.072*** 
 
0.000 0.000 0.135 
Excess past cash flow 1166 0.002 
 
89 -0.022 
 
4302 -0.011*** 
 
0.1213 0.009 0.495 
Excess future cash flow 1074 -0.005   76 -0.074   3850 -0.015***   0.004 0.161 0.023 
 
 38 
 
Table 4: Multivariate Analysis 
 
 
The table reports regression results of returns around the resignation date (Column 1) and in the year following the resignation (Column 2) on the 
resignation categories and other controls. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are 
clustered at firm level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denotes significance level at 10%,5% and 1% level. 
 
 
  (1) (2) 
Variables CAR[-4,1] CAR[2,360] 
      
D(Disagreement/Inv) -0.024 0.094 
 
(-2.311)** (1.026) 
D(No Reason) -0.012 -0.036 
 
(-2.301)** (-1.145) 
D(Commitment) -0.015 -0.074 
 
(-2.495)** (-1.681)* 
D(Personal) -0.004 -0.124 
 
(-0.526) (-1.939)* 
Tenure 0.000 0.000 
 
(2.357)** (0.064) 
Log Dir Age -0.005 0.098 
 
(-0.582) (1.379) 
D(Audit) -0.001 0.055 
 
(-0.299) (1.861)* 
D(Nomination) -0.008 -0.094 
 
(-1.553) (-2.908)*** 
D(Compensation) 0.013 0.098 
 
(1.872)* (3.020)*** 
D(Multi Departure) -0.011 -0.044 
 
(-1.415) (-1.223) 
D(Appoint Exe) 0.005 0.027 
 
(0.750) (0.585) 
D(Appoint Indep Dir) 0.013 -0.014 
 
(2.761)*** (-0.536) 
D(CEO-Chair) 0.005 -0.002 
 
(1.616) (-0.062) 
Board Size -0.000 0.008 
 
(-0.347) (1.652)* 
Independent directorships 0.002 0.028 
 
(1.300) (2.351)** 
Analyst Coverage 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.370) (-0.237) 
D(Board Busy) 0.004 0.089 
 
(0.804) (1.717)* 
Log Firm Age 0.000 0.043 
 
(0.093) (2.431)** 
Log Asset 0.001 -0.009 
 
(0.874) (-0.913) 
Log(1+ROA) 0.006 0.036 
 
(0.708) (0.669) 
Constant 0.008 -0.574 
 
(0.215) (-1.956)* 
   Observations 5,647 5,647 
R-squared 0.012 0.011 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm 
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Table 5: Mitigating Signals 
The table reports regression results of returns around the resignation date on the resignation categories, controlling for current period operating 
performance (Column 1) and information environment (Column 2). Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at firm 
level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denotes significance level at 10%,5% and 1% level. 
  (1) (2) 
Variables CAR[-4,1] CAR[-4,1] 
  
  D(Disagreement/Inv) -0.021 -0.032 
 
(-2.078)** (-2.324)** 
D(No Reason) -0.010 -0.021 
 
(-2.123)** (-2.548)** 
D(Commitment) -0.013 -0.019 
 
(-2.336)** (-2.243)** 
D(Personal) -0.002 -0.013 
 
(-0.286) (-1.183) 
D(Disagreement/Inv)*Log(1+ROA) 0.045 
 
 
(1.691)* 
 D(No Reason)*Log(1+ROA) 0.040 
 
 
(1.831)* 
 D(Commitment)*Log(1+ROA) 0.039 
 
 
(1.830)* 
 D(Personal)*Log(1+ROA) -0.032 
 
 
(-0.572) 
 D(Disagreement/Inv)*Analyst Coverage 0.001 
  
(0.934) 
D(No Reason)*Analyst Coverage 
 
0.001 
  
(2.516)** 
D(Commitment)*Analyst Coverage 
 
0.001 
  
(1.379) 
D(Personal)*Analyst Coverage 
 
0.001 
  
(1.817)* 
Tenure 0.000 0.000 
 
(2.406)** (2.352)** 
Log Dir Age -0.004 -0.005 
 
(-0.484) (-0.589) 
D(Audit) -0.002 -0.001 
 
(-0.395) (-0.299) 
D(Nomination) -0.008 -0.008 
 
(-1.551) (-1.524) 
D(Compensation) 0.013 0.013 
 
(1.865)* (1.860)* 
D(Multi Departure) -0.011 -0.010 
 
(-1.410) (-1.320) 
D(Appoint Exe) 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.812) (0.758) 
D(Appoint Indep Dir) 0.013 0.013 
 
(2.769)*** (2.786)*** 
D(CEO-Chair) 0.005 0.005 
 
(1.586) (1.657)* 
Board Size -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.284) (-0.226) 
Independent directorships 0.002 0.002 
 
(1.342) (1.313) 
Analyst Coverage 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.984) (0.900) 
D(Board Busy) 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.415) (-1.945)* 
Log Firm Age 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.109) (0.155) 
Log Asset 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.772) (0.843) 
Log(1+ROA) -0.024 0.006 
 
(-1.554) (0.685) 
Constant 0.003 0.013 
 
(0.089) (0.361) 
   Observations 5,647 5,647 
R-squared 0.015 0.013 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm 
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Table 6: Analyst Forecast Revisions 
 
 
The table reports results of an analysis of analysts’ reaction to director resignation and the reason provided. Analyst forecasts are from I/B/E/S. To be included in the revision sample, we require an 
analyst to have at least one forecast prior to filing and one revision within 6 days of filing, relating to the same fiscal year end. Panel A tabulates sample statistics for revision sample. Panel B splits the 
sample statistics by verifiability of the stated departure reasons. Panel C reports regression analysis. Change in forecast is the ratio of the change in the forecast (new forecast minus previous forecast) to 
the absolute value of the previous forecast All other variables are defined under Table 1. Constants are included but not displayed. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at 
firm level. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis. *,**,*** denotes significance level at 10%,5% and 1% level. 
 
 
Panel A: Analyst Revision Sample 
 
No. of resignations 
in full sample 
No. of resignations by 
firms covered by 
IBES 
No. of resignations that 
resulted in forecasts 
revisions Analyst coverage 
Total No. of 
revisions 
% of analysts 
making a 
revision 
Change in 
forecast t-stat p 
         
Disagreement/Investigation 89 54 9 7.89 27 38% -0.132 -1.762 0.116 
No Reason 3,487 2,420 618 9.28 1794 31% -0.251 -5.584 0.000 
Outside Commitments 694 507 146 9.80 569 40% -0.516 -3.501 0.001 
Personal  1,377 1,006 281 10.04 764 27% -0.008 -0.972 0.332 
Total 5647 3987 1054 9.52 3154 31% -0.222 -6.582 0.000 
 
 
 
Panel B: Verifiable vs. Non-verifiable 
 
No. in Revision 
Sample Analyst coverage Total No. of revisions 
% of analysts 
making a 
revision 
Change in 
forecast t-stat p   
Non-verifiable Departure 
         No Reason 618 9.28 1794 31% -0.251 -5.584 0.000 
  Outside Commitments 145 9.84 568 40% -0.520 -3.501 0.001 
  Personal  38 8.90 72 21% -0.071 -1.612 0.115 
               
          
Verifiable Departure-Negative 
         Disagreement/Investigation 9 7.964 27 38% -0.132 -1.762 0.116 
            
          
Verifiable Departure-Neutral 
         Outside Commitments 1 7.625 1 13% -0.018 na na 
  Personal  243 10.213 692 28% 0.001 0.213 0.832   
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Table 6: Analyst Forecast Revisions Continued 
 
Panel C Regression Analysis 
VARIABLES Change in forecast 
  D(Disagreement/Inv) -0.009 
 
(-0.052) 
D(No Reason) -0.175 
 
(-2.469)** 
D(Commitment) -0.404 
 
(-2.850)*** 
D(Personal) -0.125 
 
(-1.771)* 
Tenure 0.000 
 
(0.041) 
Log Dir Age 0.159 
 
(0.535) 
D(Audit) 0.117 
 
(1.549) 
D(Nomination) 0.190 
 
(1.972)** 
D(Compensation) 0.168 
 
(1.645) 
D(Multi Departure) 0.023 
 
(0.248) 
D(Appoint Exe) 0.054 
 
(0.740) 
D(Appoint Indep Dir) 0.102 
 
(1.319) 
D(CEO-Chair) 0.011 
 
(0.140) 
Board Size 0.008 
 
(0.578) 
Independent directorships -0.020 
 
(-0.699) 
Analyst Coverage 0.010 
 
(2.184)** 
D(Board Busy) -0.084 
 
(-0.464) 
Log Firm Age 0.171 
 
(3.052)*** 
Log Asset -0.065 
 
(-2.025)** 
Log(1+ROA) 0.076 
 
(0.723) 
Constant -0.769 
 
(-0.633) 
  Observations 1,054 
R-squared 0.073 
Year Fixed Effect Yes 
Cluster Firm 
 
 
